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Abstract

This studywill inspect the propaganda ofthe German Fatherland Party found in
rightist newspapers published in Berlin, the capital ofthe German Empire. This
propaganda explained the goals ofthe party, which included a desire to win a Siegfrieden
(Victory Peace), to increase the Siegeswillen (Will for Victory) within the German
population, to annex vast territoryin the East and West, and to create a unified block of
citizens within Germany by reviving the ancient myth of Deutschtum or an essential
"Germanness." In response to this new nationalistic party, the Social Democratic Party
of Germany (S P D) organized its own anti-Fatherland Party propaganda, which
successfully prevented the leftist working class from joining the Fatherland Party. This
studyis important because it illustrates the significance ofpublic opinion and explains
how the German population became politicallyactive and radicalized during the First
World War.
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Chapter I
Introduction

The German Fatherland Party (Vaterlandspartei) was an extremely conservative,
anti-parliamentary political party founded in September 1917, at the start ofthe fourth
year ofthe First World War. This partyis extremelyimportant to German history
because it was the first mass party ofthe Right. Rightist parties, prior to the formation of
the Fatherland Party, were small, exclusive bastions ofthe landed elite and powerful
industrialists more given to small debates than mobilizing the masses. In contrast, the
Fatherland Party attempted to create a more populist right-wing political organization,
which would bring together all aspects of German society. The hidden legacy ofthis
new, more radical conservative party is staggering: it dominated the political culture in
Germany for over a year and its ideas and beliefs have haunted Germany ever since.
Nationalist activists Wolfgang Kapp and Admiral Al fred von Tirpitz led the party
with the financial support ofmany wealthy businessmen and industrialists such as Al fred
Hugenberg and Carl Siemens; other important members included Prussian landowners,
Protestant ministers, and universityprofessors. 1 Kapp and Tirpitz founded the Fatherland
Partyin 1917 to bolster patriotism and the will for victorywithin Germanyand to fight
the growing peace movements in the Reichstag, which had recently passed a Peace
Resolution. During the course ofthe next year, the Fatherland Party, which claimed that
it recruited over one million members (making it on paper the largest partyin German

1

David Welch, Germany, Propaganda and Total War, 1914-1918: The Sins of Omission (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2000), 200.
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politics), created a powerful propaganda machine aimed at manipulating public opinion
in order to stop the peace movements within Germany and to promote wide annexationist
goals in Eastern and Western Europe. The historian Friedrich Meinecke, a contemporary
and critic ofthe Fatherland Party, wrote in 1946 that the "Pan- Germans and the
Fatherland party are an exact prelude to Hitler's rise to power. "2 Although Meinecke did
not offer further explanation, this statement prompted the debate, which continues ever
since, on whether the Fatherland Party was a pre-fascist organization and a precursor to
Nazism, or instead a holdover ofan earlier politics ofnotables.
Yet, in spite ofthese stakes, the historiography ofthe German Fatherland Party is
sparse, including only two monographs, one unpublished dissertation, a few articles, and
casual mentions within wider ranging histories.3 Much ofthe historiography revolves
around the key question ofwhether the Fatherland Party was a precursor to the Nazis. In
Die Erben Bismarcks, published in 1970, German scholar Dirk Stegmann concluded that

the Fatherland Party was pre- or proto-fascist because ofthe later Nazi connections of
one ofits members, Anton Drexler.4 Drexler, a locksmith working at the Munich railway
yards, joined the Fatherland Party shortly after its conception, but quickly grew
disillusioned with what he saw as its lack ofgenuine interest in the plight ofthe working
class. However, be fore Drexler officially left the party, he made contact with Wilhelm
2Friedrich Meinecke, The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollections, translated by
Sidney B. Fay (Boston: Beacon Press, 1950), 30.
3
George Etue, "The German Fatherland Party, 1917-1918" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at
Berkeley, 1959); Heinz Hagenliicke, Deutsche Vaterlandspartei. Die nationale Rechte am Ende des
Kaiserreiches (Dtisseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1997); Jay Hatheway, "The Pre-1920 Origins of the National
Socialist German Workers' Party," Journal of Contemporary History 29, no. 3 (July, 1994): 443-462; Hans
Peter Mtiller, "Die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei in Wtirttemberg 1917/18 und ihr Erbe: Besorgte Patrioten
oder rechte ldeologen?," Zeitschriftfur Wurttembergische Landesgeschichte 59 (2000):217-245; Karl
Wortmann, Geschichte der Deutschen Vaterlands-Partei, 1917-1918 (Halle, 1926).
4Dirk Stegmann, Die Erben Bismarcks. Parteien und Verbiinde in der Spiitphase des
Wilhelminischen Deutschlands Sammlungspolitik, 1897-1918 (Berlin: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1970).

2

Wahl, who was a member of the German Fatherland Party and founder of the Free
Committee for a German Workers' Peace. This war-aims committee, headquartered in
Bremen, actively recruited workers by printing "its pamphlets at government cost" and
passing "them out in factories."5 Early in 1918, Wahl contacted Drexler, urging him to
open a Munich branch of the Free Committee for a German Workers' Peace. In March
1918, Drexler agreed. After the war, Drexler's branch of the Free Committee for a
German Workers' Peace in Munich became the basis for the German Worker's Party
(later renamed the NSDAP at Hitler's urging), creating a direct link, or so Stegmann
argued, from the Fatherland Party to the National Socialists.
In 1997, Heinz Hagenliicke, another German scholar, published Deutsche
Vaterlandspartei, the most recent monograph on the subject.6 Hagenliicke argued that
the Fatherland Party was in fact not proto-fascist because "the party was explicitly
founded as a party and not a movement, members reflected the typical picture of high
Wilhelmine society in contrast to the lower class organizations of the Weimar Republic,
which sociologically reached the lower-middle class, soldiers, and the youth."7 In
addition, the Fatherland Party "was lacking the Fuhrerprinzip, which had a tremendous
impact on the NSDAP," and the party's abstention from the use of violence was not
representative of the later record of the Nazi regime. 8 However not all historians agree
with Hagenliicke's assessment, such as Hans Peter Mtiller, who argued that "the
prehistory of the Nazi movement did not begin in 1920," but "when the Pan-German
5Jeffrey Verhey, Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth, and Mobilization in Germany (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 184.
°Hagenliicke, Deutsche Vaterlandspartei.
7Ibid., 408.
8
Ibid., 408.
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ideology in the Fatherland Party found a mass base and a popular following" during the
last year of the Great War. 9
In addition, American scholars such as Raffael Scheck, Jeffrey Verhey, and David
Welch have done research on the Fatherland Party. Welch, in Germany, Propaganda and
Total War 1914-1918, wrote that the Fatherland Party was reactionary in nature, meaning
that it was "determined to maintain the status quo at home . . . while waging an aggressive
agitation campaign, for a 'peace with victorf and large-scale annexations in the East and
the West." 10 Welch agreed with Hagenli.icke that the Fatherland Party was not a
precursor for the Nazi Party. In The Spirit of 1914, Verhey likewise argued that the
Fatherland Party was not a precursor to Nazism because it failed to achieve its stated aim
of reaching the working class, although this criterion is problematic since scholars still
debate how much success the Nazis themselves in fact achieved in reaching the working
class. Nevertheless, Verhey did conclude that the party "was a pregnant failure," because
members of the party, such as Anton Drexler, went on to form more radical conservative
parties that were capable of gaining mass support. 11 Scheck, in Alfred von Tirpitz and
German Right-Wing Politics, 1914-1930, agreed with recent scholars of the Fatherland
Party that the party was not proto-fascist. However, he disagreed with Hagenli.icke's
belief that Kapp was the prime mover of the party; he assigned this role to Tirpitz. 1 2
Regardless of who actually controlled the direction of the Fatherland Party, this
new party indisputably aspired to influence public opinion in a more populist way by
9

Hans Peter Mtiller, "Die Deutsche Vaterlandspartei in Wtirttemberg 1917/18," 245.
Welch, Sins of Omission, 30.
11Verhey, Spirit of 1914, 184.
12
Raffael Scheck, Alfred von Tirpitz and German Right-Wing Politics, 1914-1930 (New Jersey:
Humanities Press, 1998).
10
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feeding its propaganda into the sympathetic, rightist press. These politically affiliated
newspapers performed the extremely important function of attempting to direct public
opinion in early twentieth-century Europe, as the population at large became more
politically aware and active. According to Peter Fritzsche in Germans into Nazis, the
experience of the First World War fundamentally changed the German public, making it
more politically active and willing "to fashion its [ own] national and economic
destiny." 1 3 In essence, by 1918, "Germany's political future had now become the people,
the great curbside republic of soldiers, workers, and consumers." 14 Astute politicians and
other forward-looking leaders of Germany recognized this new political entity and
attempted to control it using propaganda. Propaganda, according to French sociologist
Jacques Ellul, is "a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring
about active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals,
psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an
organization." 15 This definition described perfectly the techniques of the Fatherland
Party, because the organization attempted to guide the actions of a "mass of individuals,"
the German population at large.
The propaganda of the German Fatherland Party advocated holding out for a
Siegfrieden (Victory Peace), increasing the Siegeswillen (Will for Victory) within the
German population, and creating a unified block of citizens within Germany by reviving
the idea of Burgfrieden and stressing the empowering myth of Deutschtum or an essential
"Germanness." In order to create a unified block, the leaders of the Fatherland Party
13
14

Peter Fritzsche, Germans into Nazis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 82.
Ibid., 82.
1 5Jacques Ellul, Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, translated by Konrad Kellen
(New York: Vintage Books, 1965), 61.
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attempted to gain recognition among the working classes. However, these efforts were
handicapped as many socialist and leftist newspapers refused to print the party's
announcements and advertisements. Nevertheless, this situation did not mean the
Fatherland Party could not succeed in reaching portions of the working class. According
to Alex Hall, in Scandal, Sensation, and Social Democracy, unemployed workers did in
fact read non-socialist papers, in particular to find job advertisements, since employers
were unwilling to place employment announcements in socialist publications, thus
making them susceptible to the Fatherland Party's propaganda. 16 In addition, it needs to
be remembered that not all workers in Germany were socialist or even sympathetic to the
socialist cause. For instance, in the early twentieth century, there were approximately
twelve million workers in Germany and during the pivotal Reichstag elections of 1912,
the SPD polled only a little over four million votes. This meant that the socialists, at best,
only received one third of the working-class vote. 17 Thus, the working classes, whether
sympathetic to the socialist cause or not, encountered conservative newspapers, even if
they did so with skepticism.
Based on the evidence above, there was definitely an opportunity for a right-wing
party to gain influence among the working classes, although the Fatherland Party did not.
However, this does not mean that the party was a complete failure. In fact, if one

16Alex Hall,

Scandal, Sensation and Social Democracy: The SPD Press and Wilhelmine Germany
1890-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 36. Hall explicitly deals with the question of
organized workers and their reading habits.
17
See W. L. Guttsman, The German Social Democratic Party, 1875-1933: From Ghetto to
Government (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), especially chapter three; Susanne Miller and
Heinrich Potthoff, A History of German Social Democracy: From 1848 to the Present, translated by J. A.
Underwood (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 294; Mary Nolan, Social Democracy and Society:
Working-Class Radicalism in Dusseldorf, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
especially chapters eleven and twelve.
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considers that the Fatherland Party's real goal was to rally all aspects of the middle-class
behind the war effort, by creating the image of a desperate, hungry, and revolutionary
working class that would emerge in Germany if the war ended in failure, the party did
achieve some success. 18
As the Fatherland Party agitated against the policies of the Reichstag Majority
(consisting of the SPD, the Progressive Party, and the Catholic Center Party), the party
was inevitably going to make many political enemies. However, none was more
vociferous than the SPD, which was initially deeply troubled by the Fatherland Party's
aim of recruiting a mass following, along with its attempt to destroy the Peace Resolution
of July 1917 and break up the Reichstag majority. Moreover, once the leaders of the SPD
realized that the threat of the Fatherland Party siphoning off support from the working
class was minimal, a shift occurred: they began to use the image of the Fatherland Party,
produced in their media, as an enemy-image to unify the fragmented socialist movement.
These reasons motivated the Social Democrats to organize their own anti-Fatherland
Party propaganda that in part successfully prevented the leftist working class from joining
this new nationalistic party and even inspired a popular movement against the Fatherland
Party.
In order to comprehend this conflict fully, one must understand the political
milieu from which the German Fatherland Party and its counter-movement emerged.
Although many of the conflicts between the right and left had their origins prior to 1914,
18

This idea came out a discussion with Dr. Denise Phillips, assistant professor of German history
at the University of Tennessee, as we were discussing the Fatherland Party's lack of insight into the needs
of the working class. We came to a tentative conclusion that the party may have been really trying to create
an image of a resentful and revolutionary working classes to unite the middle-class ( out of fear) behind the
goals of the Fatherland Party.

7

a new political atmosphere coalesced with the declaration of war on 1 August 1914, as
the Kaiser called for a domestic peace (Burgfrieden) and the troops marched off to
Flanders in hopes of a quick victory. As reality set in and hopes for a quick victory
diminished, the Burgfrieden began to disintegrate in large part over the emerging war
aims debate.

8

Chapter II
The War Begins: Burgfrieden and German War Aims

In Au gus t 1914 crowds ofci tizens cheered Ge rmany's en tryin to the war agains t
the Allied powers . 19 Crowds formed in all the grea t ci ties of Germany. Par ticipan ts
ga thered in hopes for a glorious war; theyhoped to c rush their enemies by Chris tmas.
Many Ge rmans viewed the war as a cul tural s truggle agains t "the English shopkeeper
men tali ty, Gallic shallowness, and Slavic barbarism " in s tark con tras t to the glories of
German Kultur. 20 On 1 Augus t, Kaiser Wilhelm II pr oclaimed from the balconyof the
Royal Palace tha t "when i t comes to war, all pa rties cease and we are all bro thers. This
or tha tpar ty has a ttacked me in peace time, bu t I forgive them now whole-hear tedly."2 1
Then, three days la ter, shor tlyafter Grea t Bri tain declared war on Germany for viola ting
Belgium neu trali ty, the Kaiser pronounced from the throne in the Whi te Hall of the Royal
Palace in full mili tary uniform tha t "I know no more par ties, I only know Germans."
These two speeches ushered in the Burgfrieden ( Peace of the Cas tle), when all the
fac tions of German socie ty (in theory) uni ted to defea t their common enemies.
Al though recen tscholars have ques tioned the alleged universal unanimi ty of the
'spiri tof 1914' and the early success of the Burgfrieden, there was never theless
subs tan tial suppor t for the war in the popula tion and among the poli tical par ties of
1 9This

celebration was by no means universal within the German population, but the outbreak of
the war did create wide enthusiasm at the beginning of the war.
�ans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918, translated by Kim Traynor (New York:
Berg Publishers, 1985), 21 3-2 14. For a detailed explanation of the differences between German Kultur and
Western Civilization, see Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic
Investigations, translated by Edmund Jephcott (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1982).
21
Ralph Lutz, ed. and trans., Fall of the German Empire, vol. 1 (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1932), 4.
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Imperial Germany. 22 For instance, the "spirit of 1914" even swept up the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), as the party disregarded its established position as a
revolutionary opposition party and abandoned its traditional anti-military stance. The
SPD believed it was supporting a defensive war and hoped to end Russian despotism. To
complete the Burgfrieden, the Progressives, the Catholic Center, and the Conservatives
also rallied behind the Kaiser and the Reich.
This peace did not last. General von Moltke's failure to execute adequately the
Schlieffen Plan (if it was indeed even possible to do so) ended the expectation of a quick
victory over France. The failure to secure a quick victory caused fractures in the
Burgfrieden, as the emerging debate over war aims, which began in earnest after the
government lifted the ban on discussing war aims in 1916, destroyed the illusion that the
conflict was defensive in nature. Fritz Fischer argued that the Burgfrieden succeeded
because all parties in Germany agreed on the need to gain territorial and economic
advantages from the war. 23 This view has come under fire by recent historians, who
claim that there was in fact a serious divide in opinion over the conduct of the war. 24 One
scholar claimed the debate over war aims "polarized society into two camps: those
supporting a war of self defence [sic] and those demanding total victory with
annexations. "25 This polarization led to the collapse of the domestic peace and a

22For the most recent scholarship on the issue of the August madness and the domestic peace, see

Verhey, The Spirit of 1914.
23 Fritz Fischer, Germany 's Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton and Company, Inc.,
1 967).
24For an excellent summary of Germany's war aims, see Holger Herwig, "Tunes of Glory at the
Twilight Stage: The Bad Homburg Crown Council and the Evolution of German Statecraft, 1917/1918,"
German Studies Review 6, no. 3 (1983): 475-494. For a more recent view on this argument, see Welch, �
Sins of Omission, Chapter 3.
25
Welch, Sins of Omission, 65.
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reene rgi zed de si re fo rinternal political re fo rm bythe lefti st pa rtie s in the Reich stag.
Howeve r, be fo re the con frontation between the se two oppo sing side s reached it s clima x,
the Right and Left both e xpe rienced split s in thei r re spective g ro uping s.
The radical left wing ofthe S P D, led by Ka rl Liebknecht and Ro sa Luxemb urg,
o fficially st ruck a blow at the al readyc rumbling Burgfriedenby refu sing to vote fo rthe
fifth wa r bill in Decembe r 1915, beca use they no longe rbelieved the government' s claim
ofwaging a defen sive wa r. Thi s led to the S P D' s e jection ofthei rin subo rdinate
membe rs in Ma rch 1916. Thi s g ro up ultimately fo rmed the Independent Social
Democ ratic Pa rty ( US P D) in Ap ril 1917. Roge r Chicke ring stated, "thi s momento us
event signaled the death ofwo rk ing-cla ss solida rityin Ge rmany," a s both pa rtie s
"competed fo rthe loyaltie s of Ge rman wo rke rs." 26 Altho ugh thi s statement ha s some
t ruth, the ma jo rity ofthe sociali st wo rke rs, while po ssibly suppo rting the highlyc ritical
and vehement c ritici sm ofthe government e spo used by the US P D leade rship, still mo stly
tho ught ofthem selve s a s membe rs ofthe ma jo rity S P D and voted acco rdingly.
At the same time a s the sociali st movement wa s splinte ring, the con se rvative s
we re e xpe riencing a schi sm in thei rown rank s. The rad ical -nationali st wing ofthe
con se rvative s con si sted ofmembe rs from the national p re ssure g ro up s ofp revio us
vintage, mo st notablythe Pan -Ge rman Leag ue,the Navy Leag ue, the Ag ra rian Leag ue,
and the Defen se Leag ue. Thi s gro up ofcon se rvative s wa s, fo rthe mo st pa rt, pop uli st
(they wanted to c reate a g ra ss- root s movement not nece ssarily fo rin stit utional, elite
con se rvative s), and highly c ritical ofthe Impe rial government fo rit s pe rceived pa ssivity.

�oger Chickering, Imperial Germany and the Great War, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1 998), 159.
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These radicals believed the government should not work with the socialists, nor support
any peace proposal that did not advocate substantial annexations. One radical nationalist,
Wolfgang Kapp, director general of the East Prussian Land Bank, circulated a
memorandum, in May 1916, highly critical of the Imperial government, especially the
Imperial Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg.
Kapp sent out his memorandum to influential members of the government. It was
entitled "The National Groups and the Imperial Chancellor," and blamed Bethmann
Hollweg for the political discontent of the German population, for ending unrestricted
submarine warfare, for vacillating on war aims, and for his stance on internal reforms.
Kapp claimed that "the most faithful-minded groups of our people and specifically those
who possess the most political instinct" were discouraged, not because of "the army, the
navy, or the victorious prosecution of the war," but due to the political ineptitude of the
chancellor.27 Kapp ridiculed Bethmann's call for unity, saying that unity now meant to
"be silent, keep quiet, believe and hope everything, but lock your worries in this greatest,
most beautiful, and darkest hour in Germany history in your breast."28 Kapp compared
this statement to an older precedent: when the military governor of Berlin, Count von der
Schulenberg, told his subjects (after Napoleon's capture of the city), "'quiet is the
citizen's first duty,"' which effectively ended the dream of a popular uprising against the
French in 1806. 29 Moreover, Kapp argued that ending the U-Boot war in fact lengthened
the overall conflict and allowed America to dictate German war strategy. Another reason
for Kapp's discontent was the issue of war aims. He desired to annex Belgium and the
27

Lutz, Fall, 84.
28Ibid.
29
Ibid.
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Baltic provinces "for the safeguarding of the future of our nation."30 However, Kapp
claimed that Bethmann had forsaken Belgium already to British domination and wanted
to fight for the independence of Poles and other non-Russians under the ''Tsarist yoke",
to which Kapp replied, "We do not fight for the Poles or for other foreigners."31
On the issue of political reform, Kapp rejected any constitutional reform of
Prussian' s three-class suffrage laws, but instead claimed that "the basis of a truly political
freedom is the economic independence and the economic self-determination of the
individual" and warned not to let internal political disagreements destroy progress in this
direction. 32 Kapp concluded his letter with the following warning: "The Fatherland is in
danger! Therefore it is the right and duty of every German to break this oppressive
silence before it is too late."33 This incendiary note led Bethmann Hollweg to call Kapp
the "pirate of public opinion" and eventually produced Kapp's firing as the director of the
East Prussian Land Bank. 34 More importantly, this memorandum caused two further
developments of far more importance to the history of Imperial Germany. On the one
hand, attacks of this sort prompted the increasing dependence of the government on non
conservative members of the Reichstag. On the other, it spurred the movement of the far
right to make its voice heard, culminating in the founding of the German Fatherland Party
in September 1917.
By publicly calling for the removal of the chancellor and demanding that people
be able to voice their opinions, Kapp helped undermine the power of the government and
3°Ibid.,

31 Ibid.
32

94.

Ibid., 106.

33 Ibid.

34

"Behordliche Werbung fiir die Vaterlandspartei," Vorwiirts (Berlin), 24 Sept. 1917.
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the emperor and helped to undermine the idea that nationalism and the crown were
intertwined. In effect, Kapp helped create the milieu in which rightist opposition could
flourish. Ironically, it also created the environment for his enemies to flourish, as the
government had to rely on its traditional antagonists, the center and leftist parties, for
support.
Flexing their muscles, the traditional opposition parties (the SPD, Center, and
Progressive parties) in the Reichstag began to assert themselves by demanding political
reform and an end to the war, giving voice to popular desires (a new role they saw as
implicit in the Burgfrieden). Specifically, the leaders of the Reichstag advocated that the
Imperial government at last abolish the unrepresentative wealth-based three-class voting
system of the Prussian Landtag, which dated back to 1850 and effectively kept power in
the hands of the traditional elite (while the national Reichstag was elected by universal
manhood suffrage). The Kaiser, under pressure from a disgruntled population, published
his Easter Message on 8 April 1917 that promised to reform the Prussian suffrage system,
albeit after the successful completion of the war. The Kaiser's announcement failed to
satisfy the left and almost completely alienated the extreme right.
Furious over Bethmann Hollweg's decision not to consult the German Military
High Command (OHL) about the Easter Message, Ludendorff and Hindenburg (who
ascended to the OHL in August 191 6) began to pressure the Kaiser to replace the current
Chancellor, who served at his pleasure. The OHL claimed that Bethmann had "not
succeeded in maintaining solidarity and enthusiasm for the war in the nation" and was

14

allowing t he Left to direct domestic po licy. 35 By Ju ly 1917 t he Reic hst ag de leg ates, t he
OHL, t he r adic al rig ht , and m any he avy industri alists were all asking for t he he ad of
Bet hm ann Ho llweg, alt houg h it w as not unti l Hindenburg and Ludendorfft hre atened to
resign on 12 June 1917 t hat t he K aiser m ade Georg Mic hae lis t he new c hance llor.
Mic hae lis w as a litt le known Prussi an ci vi l ser vant, w ho bec ame apuppet oft he OHL.
T he new ly formed Reic hst ag m ajority, consisting oft he S P D, t he C at ho lic Center
P arty, and t he P rogressi ve Peop le's P arty, prompt ly voted on t he Pe ace Reso lution of 19
Ju ly 1917, cre ating e ven more angst in t he OHL. T his p lan, according to its proponents,
stipu lated ape ace in w hic h no country wou ld be forced to p ayrep ar ations and no
annex ations wou ld be m ade. Howe ver, t he reso lution "w as de liber ate lycouc hed in vague
terms " t hat allowed t he Germ an go vernment to pursue its "precise w ar aims," w hic h t he
later Tre atyof Brest- Lito vsk in 1918 exemp lified per fect ly.36 E ven t houg h t he pe ace
reso lution lacked definiti ve terms and in pr actice (as it turned out) allowed Germ an
o ffici als to ac hie ve almost anype ace, it g alvanized t he Germ an rig ht out ofits p assi vity,
as it beg an ac amp aign to counter t he pe ace and reform mo vements inside of Germ any.
In late Ju ly 1917, on t he hee ls oft he p assing oft he Pe ace Reso lution, Ludendorf f
beg an his prop ag and a "c amp aign to up lift armymor ale " and win o ver pub lic opinion on
t he home front. According to Ludendor ff, t he two were intertwined. 37 T his progr am w as
or ig in ally c alled 'en lig htenment ser vice' (Aujklarungsdienst), but w as c hanged to
'p atr iotic inst ruction' (Vaterliindischer Unterricht) in Septem ber 1917. According to
D avid We lc h, Ludendorf f's progr am stressed four ide as :
35Fischer.

36welch.
37
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1) The Causes of the War. The economic development of Germany, its
importance and
consequences of a lost war, particularly from the point of view of
the working class.
(2) Confidence in Final Victory. The war was turning decisively in Germany's
favor and
devotion to duty and manly pride are to be encouraged.
(3) The Necessity and Importance of Leadership (the army, the Government, civil
administration, industry and commerce). Hence the necessity for authority and it
[sic] corollary, obedience. There must be unflinching confidence in the Emperor and
the
princes of the federal states, as well as military leaders.
(4) The Enemy, who is placing all his hopes on our economic and political
collapse must be convinced that we cannot be beaten in the field.3 8
As will be shown later, Ludendorff's propaganda ideas were remarkably similar to the
aims of German Fatherland Party, a symmetry which many historians have noticed.
Gerald D. Feldman, in Army, Industry, and Labor in Germany, 1914-1918,
claimed outright that the OHL created the Fatherland Party and more specifically, that it
was "the brainstorm of the Chief of Military Intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolai." 39
Feldman argued that Ludendorff encouraged his associates on the right to create a mass
party to increase morale on the home front, acting as a supplement to his "patriotic
instruction" in the army. Feldman's view of Ludendorff's guiding hand in the formation
of the Fatherland Party did not win many converts among subsequent historians. Many
historians see a similarity between Ludendorff's "patriotic instruction" and the goals of
the Fatherland Party, but they do not believe Ludendorff was directly involved in creating
the party.
For instance, Martin Kitchen, in Silent Dictatorship, argued that Ludendorff and
Hindenburg matched the Marxist definition of a Bonapartist regime (a form of
dictatorship created when the middle-class acquiesces in ceding its political power to
38Welch, Sins of Omission, 207-208.
Industry, and Labor in Germnay, 1914-1918 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1966), 429.
39Gerald Feldman, Army,
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protect its material wealth from the working class), which was backed politically by the
Fatherland Party.40 More specifically, the Fatherland Party "became the organized mass
political support for the policies of the OIIl.., thus formalizing the pseudo-democratic
dimension of the bonapartism of the OIIl..."4 1 In addition, Kitchen explained that the
Fatherland Party used the propaganda apparatus of the OIIl.. to further its own aims, not
the other way around, as claimed by Feldman. Gatzke, in Germany 's Drive to the West,
and Kocka, in Facing Total War, recognized the similarity between the propagandist
aims of both organizations but neither claimed there was an official connection between
the two.42
In spite of these debates, the key point is not whether there was an official
connection between the Fatherland Party and the OIIl.., but that they were similar in spirit
and both tried to direct and influence public opinion in Germany through their
propaganda. The most significant aspect of the Fatherland Party, not previously explored
in detail, is the effect its propaganda had on public opinion within the German
population. Since the Fatherland Party was critical of the government, it could no longer
claim validity from traditional rightist sources, such as the Kaiser and his government,
and had to gain popular acceptance to have any legitimacy in German politics. In this
study, the focus is on the Fatherland Party's propaganda, in order to understand how it
tried to obtain this legitimacy. The Fatherland party attempted to create an image of itself

"°Martin Kitchen, The Silent Dictatorship: The Politics of the German High Command under
Hindenburg and Ludendorff, 1916-1918 (London: Croom Helm, 1976).
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as an organization for every German; it did not want to be viewed as the racist, anti
Semitic, conservative, or an anti-worker organization that others (then and now) have
explained it to be. This issue of self-depiction is important because the party is usually
portrayed as an extension of the national pressure groups. In reality, the party presented
itself very differently.43

By this I do not mean that the party's espoused aims were all its true goals, only that historians
need to look at how the party wanted to be seen, not only how its enemies described it, because only then
can we come closer to understanding it and how the Fatherland Party affected public opinion in the German
population.
43
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Chapter III
"The Undersigned Men of East Prussia": The Founding of the German Fatherland
Party

Admiral Al fred v on Tirpit z and W olfgang Kapp founded the German Fatherland
Party on 2 September 1917 on the 47 thanniversary ofSedan Day, a h oliday that.
c ommem orated the German vic tory ove r France in 187 0. The event t ook place in the
Y orck r oom ofthe cityhall in K onigsberg ( Y orck was a fam ous "patri otic rebel" wh o in
1812had called fo r Prussians t o overthr ow Nap ol eonic rule in Prussia) .44 This date and
l ocati on were ch osen by the leaders ofthe Fathe rland Pa rty t o ev oke the st rongest sense
ofpatri otism and nati onalism in the German p opulace by linking the party t o a Prussian 
German traditi on ofpatri otic rev olt and m obili zati on .
Admi ral v on Ti rpi tz came from the Prussian uppe r-middle class, alth ough he was
enn obled in 1900at the age of fifty- one by the Kaiser "as a mark of fav or," and occupied
the p ositi on ofSecretary ofState for the Navy from 1897- 1916.45 Identi fied with the new
Weltpolitik, he initiated Germany's naval build-up and m ode rni zati on, which fueled the

naval c om petiti on between Great Britain and Germany. Ti rpit z resigned his p ost in 1916
in pr otest at the Imperial G ove rnment's decisi on t o st op unrestricted submarine warfare.
During his year and a halfas Chairman ofthe Fatherland Party, he ti relessly pre formed
his duties, but afte rthe war and the diss oluti on ofthe p arty in Decembe r 1918, Ti rpit z
44
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spent the next years formulating plans to overthrow the Weimar Republic. However,
none of his plans reached fruition and in 1924 Tirpitz accepted a seat in the Reichstag as
a delegate of the German National People's Party (DNVP), successor to the conservative
party. He led the party until his death on 6 March 1930.
Wolfgang Kapp was born on 24 July 1858 in New York City; his father had fled
to America after the failed German revolution of 1848. In 1870, Kapp moved to
Germany to finish primary school and later to attend college. After completion of his
baccalaureate, he decided to pursue his law degree, which he earned in 1882 from the
university in Celle. After completing his law exam, Kapp rose quickly through the
bureaucratic system of Imperial Germany, becoming Prussian Agriculture Minister in
1900 and director general of the East Prussian Land Bank in 1906. As co-leader of the
Fatherland Party, he was instrumental in the policies of the party and later he became
notorious for his failed attempt to overthrow the Weimar Republic in 1920.
Both Tirpitz and Kapp were associated with many middle-class rightist groups
and in particular, the Pan-Germans (although neither were members of the Pan-German
League). The Pan-Germans, founded in 1893, were a group of super-nationalist, volkisch
(denoting a special commitment to the German people and their connection to the
German lands, usually used for racist organizations believing the German race to be
superior), imperialist, and radical activists. Although a small group, numbering around
22,000 on the eve of the First World War, it had (ironically, since it was opposed to the
government) connections and influence out of proportion to its size.46
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After the disappointing summer of 19 17, Kapp "had the fantastic idea to stimulate
a mass movement that would not only rally the Germans behind the war effort but 'raise
Tirpitz on the shield' and show that the 'people' called for him."47 Tirpitz, urged on by
Kapp and other prominent rightists, decided to lead this new movement. Tirpitz was a
great choice for the new leader because of his earlier experience with populist
propaganda techniques that he acquired while trying to pass his naval bills, which would
become useful during his tenure as First Chairman of the Fatherland Party. Tirpitz
helped make the navy a popular idea in the early 1900's by sponsoring tours of new ships
for the public, pressuring schools to explain the importance of a strong German navy, and
hiring authors to write "novels and pamphlets."48 This feat was even more impressive
because all the money for Tirpitz' s propaganda campaign for his naval bills came from
private donors. After much deliberation, the leaders finally settled on naming the new
party the German Fatherland Party, after considering other possible names including the
"Hindenburg Party" or "Bismarck Party."49 However, both of these names "would have
been considered a snub of the Kaiser" and were rejected. The party' s first manifesto,
which was published in many rightist newspapers of Germany (it appeared in the
Berliner Neueste Nachrichten three times, twice on 10 September and once on 12

September), illustrated how the leaders of the new party wanted to portray themselves to
the German public. 50
47

48
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The manifesto o fthe Fatherland Par tyopened with the statement: "Large se ctions
o fthe German publi c are not in agreement with the attitude o fthe present Rei chstag
ma jority regarding the most vital questions o fthe Fatherland." 5 1 The Fatherland Par ty
claimed that the Rei chstag ma jority did not represent the wishes o fthe people on the
issues o fnational unity, pea ce resolutions, and the state o fthe war .
The manifesto claimed that the German publi c viewed "the endeavor to pla ce
con fli ct on constitutional questions in the foreground as a danger to the Fatherland and an
advantage to the enemy." 52 Although the leaders o fthe Fatherland P arty portrayed
sympat heti callythe German people 's desire for pea ce, the manifesto des cribed the
current pea ce proposals as "nervous and weak," whi ch "only postpone pea ce" and made
Germanyappear in conse quential to its enemies. 5 3 In even more bitter terms, the par ty
program denoun ced the Rei chstag pea ce resolution as a prelude to a "starvation pea ce"
and pleaded with patrioti c Germans, "I fwe willinglybear through distress and
deprivation, the German people will gain a Hindenburg pea ce ". 54 Although the
Hindenburg pea ce was not de fined clearly (but it would be later in the party's
propaganda ), the mani festo did reassure Germans that it "wi ll ade quate lyrepay the pri ce
o fvi ctory, terrible sa crifi ce, and exertion." 55
In an attempt to re-create the alleged Spirit o f 1914, the manifesto urged the
German people to be "united in the will to vi ctory" and in the spirit o f Burgfriedenaimed
"at welding together the whole energy o fthe Fatherland without distin ction o fpar ty
51 Lutz, Fall, 368.
52
Ibid.
53Ibid.
54
Ibid., 369.
55Ibid., 369-370.

22

politi cs," w ork ing "hand in hand for the confirmati on ofthe will t o con quer and t o
over come di fficulties. "56 This new partyde pi cted itselfas the onlyh ope for the German
pe ople, pr om ising t o res cue Germany fr om the ma chinati ons ofthe Rei chstag ma jor ity
and the S P D in pa rti cular. The last w ords are par ti cul arly poignant:
T o all wh o subs cr ibe t o these views we a ppeal t o join the German
Fatherland Party. Anyone wishing t o hel p is wel come. The aims ofthe par ty
must be realized at on ce. N ot a m oment is t o be l ost.
Germany's salvati on, h on or, and future is at stake ! 57
The plat form als o contained cer tain un cons ci ous ambiguities and pe rplexing
statements. F or exam ple, the writers den oun ced the British for think ing ofthe First
W orld Wa ras a "matter ofbusiness," but theylater a ppealed t o the material interests of
the German pe ople bystating that the "starvati on pea ce " im peded "our positi on in the
w orld and a ccom panying int olerable burdens w ould destr oy our com mer cial situati on and
all the pr os pe cts of our w orking classes."58 M ore over, the founders ofthe par tyde clared
that theyre presented all Germans, but pla ced em phasis on their own Prussian her itage by
writing that "the undersigned men of East Prussia ... have founded the German Fatherland
Party" and continu ously refe rred onlyt o the Prussian greatness of Germany. 59 F or
instan ce, theydid n ot menti on the her itage of Charlemagne or any other great H oly
Roman Em per or, bu t only wr ote a b ou t Germany's re cen t Pruss ian and n on-Ca th ol ic
traditi on, "calling to mind wi th grati tude our first bel oved Emper or ofundying mem ory
and his i ron Chan cell or," wh owaged a "titani c struggle against destru ctive partystrife."60
The Fatherland Party's con centrati on on Germany's Prussian past was used byits
56
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enemies, especially the Center Party, to claim that the Fatherland Party did not represent
all Germans.
In addition, the constant mention of Bismarck and the "first beloved Emperor"
usually occurred in patriotic leagues that opposed the new Kaiser and Chancellor Leo von
Caprivi after the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890. 6 1 This was a way of veiling criticism of
the present monarch and his government. According to Roger Chickering's study of the
Pan-Germans, "Bismarck in retirement endowed with his own enormous symbolic capital
a populistic 'German-national' ideology which he had, as chancellor, resolutely
opposed."62 How could the party claim to be patriotic and at the same time oppose the
current administration in the time of war? The leaders of the Fatherland Party, as
described by Eley's definition of "national opposition," believed that anyone opposed to
their ideals, even the Kaiser, was unpatriotic.
After the publication of the original manifesto, the leaders of the party released a
second shorter manifesto, which was published in the Deutsche Tageszeitung (a
newspaper affiliated with the Agrarian League) and twice in the Berliner Neueste
Nachrichten. The declaration appealed to all "German citizens" to follow the lead of the

"sorely tired and robust" men of the Eastern Mark, who " during the Freedom Wars a
hundred years ago" led Germany to victory, in "gathering all the patriotic forces
together" to defend the Fatherland. 63 The manifesto asserted that Germany's "enemies led
by President Wilson know that they cannot defeat us in war; therefore they rely on the
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Germ an ignor ance [ofthe actu al st ate ofthe w ar ] to swindle their w ay to victory!" 64 "But
they are wrong," bec ause the Germ an army and n avyrem ain victorious, and the U -Boots,
the m anifesto announced resolutely, are "dr aining the life -blood out ofour enemies."65
The le aders ofthe F atherl and P arty admonished Germ ans not to su rrender "wh at
Bism arck fought for and Hindenburg p reserved " by accepting a "hunger pe ace, which
would cre ate unbe ar able burdens and sh ackle Germ any for m anycenturies," but inste ad
to fight fo r ape ace th at would assure Germ any's "free development and a new
flourishing " after the w ar. 66
On 14 September, Conr ad von W angenheim, the le ader ofthe Agr ari an Le ague
and member ofthe executive committee ofthe Germ an F ather land P arty, published h is
own person al appe al to the people of Germ any. W angenheim encour aged the Germ an
people to put aside their di fferences c aused by "occup ation, religion, and p arty," in order
to protect the F atherl and in its time ofneed .67 He also dem anded th at the "members of
the Ag rari an League join, en m asse, the Germ an F atherl and P arty and to support it with
all their might," bec ause the F atherl and P artyst ands for "Germ any's rescue, honor, and
future."68
. Following these three announcements, the executive committee ofthe F atherl and
P arty scheduled its first public r allyon 24 September in the Berlin Philh armonic. The
p artysp ared no expense in adve rtising for the r ally, pl acing advertisements in newsp apers
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throughout Berlin.69 The rally met with enthusiastic support as hundreds of Berliners
crammed into the Philharmonic. The first speaker was Duke Albrecht of Mecklenburg,
the president of the Colonial League and the titular head of the Fatherland Party.
Albrecht was greeted with long, animated applause as he reached the podium. His speech
harkened back to August 1914, when all of Germany was said to be united in spirit for a
German victory. He asked the German people to rediscover this solidarity in order to
secure victory, which was within reach. Germany, stressed Albrecht, had "achieved
victories both on land and in the air such as the world has never seen," and it was only
due to England's venomous propaganda that Germany had to fight "people of all races
and colors [and] murder instruments of all kinds."70 Albrecht continued triumphantly,
stating that "we will defeat them, all it takes is for the German people to unite in the same
way as the soldiers at the front. "7 1 Some in the crowd responded by shouting, "That's
right."72 Triumphantly, Albrecht told the audience that the Fatherland Party was a
center for all faithful Germans who have this one goal: to achieve a peace that
will secure our position in Europe and the world, that will allow our people to
recover from horrendous losses and sacrifices, that will allow Germany to develop
freely, and that will assure that no one will dare attack us again. (Vivid
approval.)73
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Albrecht ended his speech with an appeal for every German man and woman to "gather
around the Fatherland Partyto become a strong union like our heroes at the front ! Heil
Deutschland ! 74
Grand Admiral von Tirpi tz followed Duke Albrecht, and his speech focused on
three issues: the pligh t ofthe working class, Germany's enemies, and the aims ofthe
Fatherland Pa rty. Tirpitz explained that the horrible e ffects ofthe war had created a need
to "pr ovide for the poorer c lasses, to secure their social position, and to increase
tremendouslytheir pa rticipation in state and communityissues."75 He added that
Germany must force the Allies to pay reparations, in order to foil the "victoryof Anglo 
American capitalism " and guarantee the securityofthe working classes.76
Shifting the sub ject, Tirpitz described the enemies of Germany and the Fatherland
Pa rty. Although England (the name Great Britain was ne ver used), France, Russia, and
(beginning in 1917) America were Germany's enemies, surprisingly the Fatherland P arty
did not include any references to Russia in its propaganda and onlyvaguelymentioned
France, explaining, "If France is against us in this [World War One ], the reasons are
historic and pathological ." 77 The party reserved most ofits propaganda for England and
its purported puppet, America.
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The Fatherland Party maintained that the English was "the originator of the world
conflagration."78 It announced that England started the war because Germany was a
"strong economic competitor and they did not want to compete peacefully," for all
Germans know that "for the English the war is a matter of business."79 The party also
accused England of wanting "to kill the soul of the German people" and of fighting the
war "in a devilish manner by attempting to kill our innocent women and children through
hunger to force our men to their knees." 80 This argument is significant because it
revolves around the common idea of German Kultur, as opposed to Western Civilization.
Germany, before the First World War and later the horrors of World War II and the
Holocaust, prided itself on its distinct cultural superiority, which Germans referred to as
Kultur that stood in stark contrast to the Western idea of civilization. To the Germans,

Civilization represented mundane and artificial phenomena, such as economics and
technology, while Kultur represented more lofty ideals. In effect, the propaganda of the
Fatherland Party tried to reinforce an already current image of England as an aggressive,
materialist, greedy civilization attacking and trying to impose its beliefs on the more
spiritual, cultured German people.
Moreover, the Fatherland Party blamed England for forcing or tricking other
countries into the war against Germany, especially America. Tirpitz, at the party's first
rally, exclaimed that America had declared war on Germany because it "has become the
puppet of Anglo-Saxon capitalism," for Germany "from the birth hour forward" has only
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been friendly towards Ameri ca. 8 1 Ti rpi tz de clared tha t "ifWashing ton could des cend
from Heaven, he would no t tolera te Ameri ca's move." 82 Fu rthermore, the Fa therland
P artys ta ted tha t "Germany is leading the fig ht for freedom of the en tire European
con tinen tagains t the tyrannyof Anglo- Ameri canism tha t is devouring everything." 83
On the topi c of the Fa therland P arty's a ims, Tirpi tz cla imed tha t the p arty wan ted
to "ga ther all the for ces of Germany to a ccomplis h one grea t cause [a vi ctorious end to
the Firs tWorld War ] and i tdid no tiden tify itselfwi th any single organi za tion." 84
A cknowledging tha t in order to su ccessfully end the war, the German people needed to
come toge ther, Tirpi tz annou nced triump han tly tha t "mili ta ryand poli ti cal vi ctoryis
alreadyours; all we need for vi cto ryis to join toge ther wi th all our hear ts and will
power." 85
Agrarian leader Conrad von Wangen heim's spee ch began where Tirpi tz lefto ff,
s tressing the impor tan ce ofuni ty. Wangen heim claimed tha t German y's enemies were
trying to s ha tter the uni ty of the German people. T herefore i t was the obliga tion of the
Fa therland Par ty "to unifyall classes, all par ties, and all religions" in Germany to ensure
a vi ctorious pea ce. 86 Wangen heim hoped tha t "throug h the fires ofwar the German
people would form an unbreakable blo ck" to a ctas a pillar ofsuppor t for the soldiers a t
the fron t and the governmen t. 87 Wangen heim s tressed tha tparliamen tarians ( the
Rei chs tag ma jori ty) had los t tou ch wi th the German people and do no t unders tand "how
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to use the people's determination and willingness to sacrifice" to achieve a victory peace
that would secure Germany's future.88 Wangenheim concluded his speech with a
passionate appeal for German "inner unity, such as the army is showing in battle" and
exclaimed: "Kaiser, listen to your people; they will sacrifice anything, endure anything to
achieve victory."89
Wolfgang Kapp, the last speaker of the rally, followed the lead of the previous
speakers by emphasizing the importance of German unity. However, Kapp began his
speech by reading telegrams from the supporters of the Fatherland Party throughout
Germany. One telegram, from Bremen carpenter Heinrich Spener, the president of the
Free Committee for a German Workers' Peace (the same organization that Anton Drexler
would join before creating the German Workers' Party), stated:
The new Committee for a German Worker's Peace announces that all of
its 65,000 members have joined the Fatherland Party. We promise to educate our
working people in order to strengthen their will to endure until our final victory.
We trust Hindenburg and the U-Boots. We trust the national spirit within the
German working people and despite all sacrifices, we will endure the hardships of
war until Hindenburg declares the job done. 90
Another telegram, from the town council of Gross-Mellen (a small city in the state of
Brandenburg), simply read, "We do not want an Erzberger-Scheidemann peace."9 1 Since
Erzberger and Scheidemann were the leaders of the Catholic Center and Social
Democratic parties respectively, this statement made clear that the leaders of Gross
Mellen opposed the Reichstag Majority's peace proposal.
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Ne xt, K app told the audience th at ninety loc al ch apters ofthe F atherl and P arty
h ad alre ady been cre ated all over Germ any. According to K app, this tremendous
response and the fact th at the F atherl and P arty in such ashort time recruited "one -third of
the people behind Scheidem ann," completed the unific ation ofthe Germ an people behind
the aims ofthe F atherl and P arty and in opposition to the p arli ament. 92 Although K app
e xagger ated gre atly the success ofthe p arty, its future did indeed seem promising. The
enemies ofthe F atherl and P arty, K app insisted, were the p arties without "any faith in
Germ any's might and endur ance."93 In contr ast to its enemies, the F atherl and P arty
w anted to "strengthen the Germ an people 's will for victory" and to "silence the spirit of
p artypolitics and disunity. " 94 Moreover, the F atherl and P artydesired to cre ate "peace
between the city and country and between the middle cl ass and the working cl ass, which
until now h as sh attered the unityofthe Germ an people," byinste ad emph asizing a
common Germ aness. 95 In closing, Kapp told the audience to fight ag ainst the Reichst ag 's
"st arv ation pe ace ", repe ated his desire to strengthen the people 's will for victory, and
advised everyone to advertise for the p arty. "Long live the Germ an people, long live the
K aiser," K app shouted as he left the podium, to which the audience responded by singing
"Deutschl and Uber alles. "96
These opening public ations and speeches describe the ide as ofthe F atherl and
P arty about its own ch ar acter, which e xemplifies the difference ofthis p arty to the old
p arties ofthe r ight, which h ad followed a "politics ofdi fference," as elite b astions of
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social notables rather than as rallying-points for politically energized masses. The
traditional Conservative Party was unable to transform itself into a mass party, because
the "legacies of Prussianism, agrarianism, and anti-intellectualism imposed burdens on
the party that were too heavy to permit the flights of fancy engaged in by Pan-Germanists
and others in the right-wing vanguard."97 However, in 1917, this "right-wing vanguard"
realized its goals with the creation of the Fatherland Party, which became the first mass
party of the right. In addition, this new party's belief in the importance of propaganda
and its effect on public opinion, has more in common with the European fascist regimes
of the post-war period than the old-style traditional conservative politics of Imperial
Germany.
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Chapter IV
"Germany Wake Up!": The Print Propaganda of the Fatherland Party
The org ani zers ofthe F atherl and P arty were new in the intensityoftheir belief
th at prop ag and aw as cruci al in controlling public opinion within Germ any. The p arty
administr ation org ani zed priests , journalists , and te achers to act as tr aveling lecturers
spre ading the mess age ofthe p arty th roughout the Reich. They were sent to specific
regions according to their religion and pl ace ofbi rth , the better to m ake cont act with the
m asses. For ex ample , a C atholic B av ari an would be sent to B av ari ato address a
predo min antly C atholic audience . K app even suggested letting "sever al lecturers spe ak
at once in order to re ach abro ader audience." 98
The p arty also founded apress dep artment under the control of Dr. Klemens
Klein , aprofession al histori an and the chiefeditor ofthe Dusseldoif Zeitung from 19071915, th at dissemin ated prop ag and avi anewsp apers and other printed medi a. In order to
re ach the bro adest audience possible , the p arty w anted to publish its prop ag and ain leftist
and liber al newsp apers , but m any ofthese newsp apers were not willing to print the
F atherl and P arty's announcements. As aresult ofthis (sc arcelysurprising) refus al, the
m ajority of the F atherl and P arty ' s prop ag and aw as fou nd in righti st p aper s. Thi s study
only focuses on newsp apers published in Berlin, the c apit al ofthe Reich and he ad qu arters
ofthe F atherl and P arty. The prop ag and acont ai ned in these conserv ative and right-wing
newsp apers highlighted themes simil ar to those initi ally found in the p arty's first
m anifesto and public r ally, such as the need to unifythe people of Germ any, to incre ase
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the will to victory within the German population, to ensure the future prosperity of
Germany by achieving a victory peace, and to reassure the citizens that the German
military remained strong and triumphant in the field.
The idea of unity was one of the most frequently recurring topics found in the
Fatherland Party's propaganda. The party portrayed itself as a patriotic grouping open to
all Germans regardless of class, race, or party. One article announced that "in the
German Fatherland Party, a tremendous movement of the people emerges that raises the
flag of victory as a unifying symbol over all internal conditions."99 In an attempt to
appeal to as many people as possible, the party claimed that it was "neither conservative
nor liberal, neither agrarian nor heavy industrialist, neither Army League nor Pan
German" and that "everybody who wants to help save Germany is welcome !" 1 00
Moreover, the party claimed that "members of the German Fatherland Party come from
all circles of the working, earning (Erwerbenden), and creating people and from all
parties." 101
To add to its appeal, the Fatherland Party linked itself to the Supreme Command
and the Kaiser to create a comprehensive image of patriotism and obedience to authority
excluding the Reichstag. The party hoped this stance would be mimicked by the public.
Field Marshall von Hindenburg, a popular war hero, stated in a letter to the Fatherland
Party that the hope of "starting a new Burgfrieden" should "stir every German's heart, no
matter what party they belonged to, and should weld them together in a steady patriotic
99
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block (Vaterlandsblock)." 1 02 Even though some members ofthe Fatherland Partywere
openly critical ofthe Kaiser (such as Heinrich Class, who had written a scathing book in
1913 entitled "If I Were the Kaiser ") in their attempt to achieve German unity, the party
used the name and the idea ofthe Kaiser to further its goals. In a telegram to the Kaiser,
the Fatherland Partyclaimed that its ultimate goal was to "preserve Germany's welfare "
and it pledged support to the Kaiser and his "kaiserlich " politics, which would lead to
victory. 103 Although Wilhelm II did not reply as warmlyas Hindenburg did to the
compliments bythe leaders ofthe Fatherland Party, he did of ficially thank the "East
Prussian men who gathered to support the welfare ofthe German Fatherland." 1 04
In March 1918, at the acme of German military success in the war, the executive
committee ofthe Fatherland P artysent the Kaiser another telegram congratulating him on
the signing ofthe Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Russia. It stated that theysupported in
"rock -steady faith " their supreme commander, who will lead Germanyto a victorious
peace that "will steadily build Ge rmany's future at home and abroad." 105 This time, the
Kaiser 's response to this telegram was much more enthusiastic, as he expressed his
"highest gratitude " to the men ofthe Fatherl and Party. 106
The Fatherland Partywanted to be seen as actively suppor ting the OH L, the
Kaiser, and to link itselfto the greatness of Germany's past (as seen in the original
manifesto), in order to form a nascent "folk community" within German society by
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stressing a unique essential Germandom (Deutschtum). Tirpitz warned Germans not to
let their enemies "yet again succeed in defeating" them through civil war, as defeat in the
current "world struggle would lead to the unstoppable downfall of Deutschtum." 1 07
Tirpitz admonished the Germans to be aware of their own "inherited evils," especially a
propensity to internal strife, and encouraged "everybody to use their personal force for
the sake of the whole, not for personal, selfish gains." 1 08 While both men and women
were important to this new community, women, according to Tirpitz, needed to ensure in
particular that their children learned about "Deutschtum inside and outside of school." 1 09
This idea of "essential Germaness" was a means to foster a united "folk community,"
creating an environment where all Germans, regardless of class, region, or religion, could
come together to work for Germany's common good.
In order to attract ordinary Germans, especially the working classes, the
Fatherland Party warned them that the Reichstag majority's peace resolution would
jeopardize their own economic fortunes and labored to refute the ideas that the Fatherland
Party wanted to continue the war and opposed internal political reforms. The party's
propaganda stated that only "a Hindenburg or victory peace" would ensure the safety and
security of Germany and its people. The Fatherland Party asserted that the Peace
Resolution of July 1917 was a "peace of renunciation" (Verzichtfrieden), which would
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cause "Germany's downfall." 1 1 0 This downfall would economically cripple the German
working class and would damage Germany's "position in the world." 1 1 1 Moreover,
during the Fatherland Party's rally in the Berlin Philharmonic, Hamburg businessman
Mr. J.C. Jensen, the self-proclaimed advocate of the working classes, explained that the
"sacrifice peace" would destroy the economic viability of the German people and the
working classes would be especially hard-hit. 1 1 2
The most damaging critique of the Fatherland Party was that it was reactionary
and therefore against all political reforms, which hurt the party in winning the masses to
its side. However, the party realized this danger and tried to assure the German
population that it was apolitical and not reactionary. The leaders of the Fatherland Party
(whether candidly or not) claimed to stand aside in all political debates and professed that
internal reforms were not important now that only the will to win to the war was vital to
Germany's survival. Kapp and Tirpitz's avowed ultimate goal was to end party strife and
unite the people behind them in a unified block. They argued that the majority parties
were only attacking the Fatherland Party out of fear because each of these parties was
"losing its members to the Fatherland Party." 1 1 3 Moreover, the Fatherland Party decreed
that it had "no internal political goals" and did not want "to revive the times of class
battles." 1 14 Contradicting a socialist attack that claimed that the Fatherland Party desired
to deny "constitutional reform for the German people," General Friedrich Wilhelm
Freiherr von Bissing, a member of the Fatherland Party and former German Governor1 1 0"Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung.
1 1 1 Lutz, Fall, 370.
1 1 2Vaterlandspartei, Ziele, 43.
1 13Deutsche Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Kolonialzeitung.
1 14Ibid.
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Genera l ofoccupied Be lgium, responded that these a llegations were untrue and that he
"wou ld leave the par tyifthese accusations were co rrect." 1 1 5
Whi le Genera l von Bissing made the most forcefu l response to the Father land
Pa rty's critics, Georg von Be low, a professor ofhistoryat the University of Freiburg, had
the most imaginative. He announced that the Father land Par tydid not be lieve that
constitutiona l reform was the most pressing issue to discuss during w ar. In fact, Be low
comp ared the discussion ofinterna l re form during war time to a man discussing frivo lities
whi le watching his house bu m down. However, even this man had more sense than those
demanding po litica l reform because houses "have fire insurance but the German state
does not." 1 1 6
In response to the c laim that one member, Lieutenant- Genera l von K luge, said the
Father land Par tywas against constitutiona l reforms in Germany, the party administration
issue da statement c laiming K luge "simp ly said, 'The Father land Par ty is being fought by
such peop le who a re striving on ly for immediate democratization,instead offor a fina l
German victory."' 1 1 7 The Father land Par ty, the statement continued, "refuses any
statemen t concerning inn er po li tica l ques tions " and "mere ly s trives for tha t one aim,
name lyto strengthen the wi ll for victory in the Ge rman peop le." 1 1 8
This wi ll for victory meant, for the leaders of the Father land Par ty, to "wake up "
the German peop le, to make them understand that Germanymust emerge from the fires
ofwar victorious and stronger than it was at the beginning ofthe war. For this to occur,
1 1 5 "Die Angst vor der Vaterlandspartei," Deutsche Tageszeitung (Berlin), no. 503, 21 Oct. 1917.
1 1 6Georg von Below, Das gute Recht der Vaterlandspartei (Berlin: Deutsche Vaterlandspartei,
1917), 15.
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all Germans mus t be willing to sacrifice for a 'Hindenburg peace." To gain this
"Hindenburg peace," the Fa the rland P artyhad to "sha tter the Reichs tag ma jori ty" and by
implica tion weaken the Reichs tag i tself. 1 1 9
Ironically, the propaganda of the Fa therland P arty s tressed the hardships and
sacrifices the people had alreadymade for the war effor t, in order to increase the will to
vic tory wi thin Germany. The propaganda explained tha t the "horrendous sacrifices " of
the pas t years would be for naugh t if Germans accep ted the "hunger peace " of the
Reichs tag and claimed tha tonly "a peace ofvic tory" could redeem these sacrifices. 1 20
The leaders of the p artyannounced "tha t after three years ofwar the de termina tion of the
German people to figh t for a vic torypeace has no tweakened," and expressed their joyin
the fac t tha tno thing would des troy "the will to win " in the German people. 1 2 1 Al though
the leaders of the Fa therland P arty focused on these serious themes to boos t the will for
vic tory, they were no tagains t using a ttemp ts a t levi tyand melody to spread their
message. For ins tance, the following ponderous tune ade qua te !ysummarized the
Fa therland Party 's message regarding the will to vic tory:
Serious obliga tions are calling us in these hard times.
Therefore we are willing to personally sacrifice.
But we cann ot in the final har da ndhea te d figh t
Poli ticallysacrifice the reward o fa German vic tory.
We an nounce this ye t again
A nd we ann ounce i t frank and free
And s tand wi th German Fai th fulness
1 1 9"Deutsche
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Behind the Fatherland Part y. 1 22
The will to victor y was supposed to achieve a peace for German y that would
protect "what Bismarck fought for and Hindenburg preserved." 1 23 However, in realit y,
the victor ypeace championed b y the Fatherland Part yaimed for much more. The victor y
peace was intended to ensure German y's future prosperit y, econo micall yand defensivel y,
providing all that "German yneeds for its development after its horrible bloodletting "
during the First World War. 1 24 The Fatherland Part y couched its annexationist aims in
terms ofits vision ofa victor ypeace. For instance, the opening announcement ofthe
Brandenburg Provincial Branch ofthe Fatherland Part ystated that in order for "our sons
and grandsons " to live in "a proud, free countr y," "Belgium must not again become a
vassal state of England "; instead, it must come under German in fluence . 1 25 In even more
clear terms, the Fatherland Pa rt y announced that it expected the following things to be
achieved during the peace negotiations with Russia:
the militar y securit yofour borders, the necessar y lands for settlements in order
to strengthen the power ofthe people, which has been weakened b y the tremendous blood
sacrifice ofthe war, the stead y positioning ofthe German forces at the Baltic Sea, the
freedom ofmovement for all Germans and the sec ure protection ofthe cult ural and
economic work ofour neighbor countries. 1 26
Yet again, Professor von Below provided the most e ye-opening statements
regarding annexations in his pamphlet Das gute Recht der Vaterlandspartei, where he
outlined the annexation designs ofthe Fatherland Pa rty in the Eastern and Western
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Eur ope. He proclaimed that "the Fatherland Partydemands the guarantee ofa
tremendous German in fluence in the East," which included the lands of Kurland,
Lithuania, and Estonia. 1 27 Analyzing the argument ofthe Progressive Party's
re presentative in the Reichstag Georg Gothein that Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania should
be given to Poland, Below re plied that this plan would be harmful to Germany's future,
because it would "sacrifice good agricultural land, which could also be used for German
settlements ." 1 28
On the issue of Belgium, Below ex plained that the Fatherland Partydesired to
control the Flemish-s pea king areas, which had always been a goal of Al fred von Tir pit z.
Tir pit z believed that Germanyhad to gain control ofthe Flanders coast to achieve naval
paritywith England . The Fatherland Party, following a plan by General von Bissing,
ho ped for hostilitybetween the Flemings and Walloons ( French-s pea king Belgians) in
Bel gium, because in fluential members ofthe party believed that once the Flem ings
achieved inde pendence, they would naturally, "in order to have a bright future," join the
Reich . 1 29
In addition to te rritory, the Fatherland Partydemanded re parations from the
Entente to ensure Germany's economic viability. Professor Below wrote that the German
government should demand war re parations to guarantee "a flourishing develo pment " of
the German economyafter the war and anyone who disagreed was a "Dummko pf." 1 30 In
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conclusion, Below warned the German people that a peace without reparations or
annexations would make Germany appear weak in the eyes of its enemies. 13 1
One of the main problems facing the Fatherland Party in its mission to improve
the will for victory and achieve a "Hindenburg peace" was the belief held by some
discouraged sections of German society that World War I was turning in the favor of the
Allies. While this sentiment might have been accurate, as exemplified by America's
declaration of war on Germany in April and the success of the British blockade, there was
also seeming evidence to the contrary. For instance, during the summer of 1917 French
troops went on strike (although not known at the time by Germans), the Third Battle of
Ypres gained no considerable advantage for the Allies, and American troops had yet to
arrive on the continent in force (German naval officers promised to prevent all American
landings). Moreover, on 3 December 1917, following the Bolshevik Revolution in
Russia, Lenin's government signed an armistice with Germany. Hence, there was ample
evidence that could be exploited to make the German people believe that victory was
within grasp and this was exactly what the Fatherland Party did with its depictions of the
German military as strong and victorious in the field of battle.
The leadership of the Fatherland Party explained that the war was going well for
Germany as "our armies are fighting victoriously at the front, our navy is unshakeable,
and our U-Boots, being certain of victory, are draining the life-blood of our enemies." 1 32
Backing up this statement, Hindenburg told the German people excitedly during the fall
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of 1917 that victory was in the air. 133 Furthermore, the Fatherland Party proclaimed that,
"out in the fields, heroism and the sacrifice of our brothers shines with a brighter
brilliance and the helplessness of our enemies becomes more and more apparent as the
efficiency of our U-Boots and Luftwaffe becomes more and more deadly." 134 The
Brandenburg Provincial Branch of the Fatherland Party described, in even more detail,
the state of war in November 1917:
After the forcible occupation of Riga and Osei, after the incomparable stroke of
genius in the break-through from the Isonzo to the Tagliamento, with its
immeasurable military and political results, and considering the inflexible
resistance of our heroes on the Western front, we at home have really now only
one duty-not to jeopardize the victorious issue by our behavior. It is not for
Germany and her allies but for the enemy to speak now if they want to negotiate.
We can afford to wait for that after the brilliant results of the Seventh War Loan,
and knowing that our economic supplies are assured. Russia is done for, and Italy
will soon be done for, too. France has half bled to death in England's service and
England herself is full of apprehension and is fighting our submarines, watch in
hand. 1 35
It is not difficult to understand how many German people could be duped into
believing that victory was within reach with these vivid descriptions of the glorious state
of the German military. The fact that the German people endured through the fourth year
of the war, facing increasing destitution, without any massive riots or revolutions shows
that at least a significant portion of the population trusted this type of propaganda.
Another belated testament to the strength of this propaganda is that many Germans were
unwilling to accept defeat even years after the First World War ended as shown in the
wide-spread belief in the stab-in-the-back legend and the cult of the military that later
flourished in the Weimar Republic.
133"Hindenburg
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The Fatherland Party's propaganda that emphasized unity and a powetful military
did have a profound effect on the German population, as represented by the fact that the
Fatherland Party gained an impressive number of members (although likely not as many
as claimed). Moreover, after the formation of the Fatherland Party, the Reichstag
Majority did not make any more peace overtures. Although there were many other
reasons for not issuing other peace proposals, such as the lack of a favorable response
from the international community to the first announcement, the fact that it received an
unfavorable reception from parts of society inside of Germany also played a role. What
would be the outcome of the Fatherland Party attacking the majority parties in an attempt
to win the battle of public opinion? In an attempt to answer this question, one must
examine the countermovement the Fatherland Party inspired.
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Chapter V
Eight Months of Agitation: The Social Democratic Party's Clash with the
Fatherland Party

The Fa therland Par ty, wi th i ts a ttack on the poli tical sys tems of the Reichs tag,
a ttrac ted cri ticism from many fron ts . The Na tional Liberals, al though spli t by the
forma tion of Ti rpi tz's par ty, did voice some opposi tion, as shown in the crea tion of the
People's Associa tion for Freedom and Fa therland, whose "spiri tual leaders were Berlin
Professors E. Troel tsch, Meinecke, and Herker." 1 36 This organi za tion wan ted to recrea te
the Burgfriedenof 1914and, unlike the Fa ther land Par ty, suppor ted in ternal reforms .
Howe ver, this associa tion ne ver gained more than one thousand members and "e ven
a ttemp ted to merge wi th the German Fa therland Par ty" in the final days of the w ar.1 37
The People's Ass ocia tion failed, according to Meinecke, because "many bourgeois
elemen ts a t this time joined the Fa therland Par ty wi th li velyen thusiasm, under the
illusion tha ti t represen ted the true na tional in teres ts." 1 3 8
One would assume tha t the three par ties tha t formed the Reichs tag Ma jori ty and
drafted the Peace Resolu tion of July 1917 would s tand firm agains t the Fa therland Par ty,
which s trongly and vehemen tlyagi ta ted agains t their resolu tion and desire for in ternal
re forms. Ye t, surprisingly, this was no texac tly the case. Bo th the Progressi ve Par tyand
the Cen ter Par ty in fac t responded ambi valen tly towards the Fa therland Par ty. Al though
the Pr ogressi ve Par ty urged i ts members no t to join the Fa therland Par ty, some prominen t
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Progressive Party members, such as Dr. Korte and Dr. Direchlet, were among the first to
join it. 139 Even more shocking, one of the Progressive Party's official newspapers, the
Vossische Zeitung, published propaganda from the Fatherland Party in abundance. The
party's other paper, the Berliner Tageblatt, while not covering the Fatherland Party
warmly, did not speak out against it harshly either. It only contained one article that
represented the Fatherland Party negatively.
The Center Party stated in its party newspaper, Gennania, that the Fatherland
Party was "not a unifier because it caused internal fragmentation" and explained that the
name "Vaterland" implied that only ethnic Germans were welcome. 1 40 The issue of
ethnicity was important to the leaders of the Center Party because some of the party's
members came from non-German Catholics, such as the Poles, living within the borders
of the Germany. The Center Party also "explicitly declared that each and every
committee member of the Center refused and will continue to refuse to join the German
Fatherland Party." 1 4 1 Even though no "committee" members enlisted in the Fatherland
Party, "a number of prominent Centrists, mostly of the aristocratic right wing, became
members of Kapp's organization." 1 42 Moreover, Gennania published some propaganda
and advertisements from the Fatherland Party, although not as extensively as the
Vossische Zeitung.
In contrast to the Center and Progressive parties, the SPD responded vigorously
and fervently against the founding of the Fatherland Party from the beginning, for a
number of reasons. First, the SPD did not have many members join the Fatherland Party.
1 39Wortmann, Geschichte, 104.
1 40"Zentrum und Vaterlandspartei," Germania (Berlin), no. 477, 14 Oct. 1917.
1 4 1 Ibid.
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Second, the S P D, unlike the Centrists and Progressives, had no ma jor internal
disagreements over the Peace Resolution of 19 July. Third,the S P D reacted violently
against the Fatherland Party's trying to recruit members from the working class, the
traditional strength ofthe S P D (even though only roughlyone-third of German workers
were socialists). Lastly, once the S P D reali zed that the Fatherland Party was not making
inroads into the working class, it began to use the negative image ofthe Fatherland Party,
which the S P D had created in its propaganda, as a means to try to repair its own inte rnal
schism of March 1916. For these reasons, the S P D 's propaganda campaign against the
Fatherland Partywas massive and quite successful in shaping socialist workers ' opinions
of Tirpit z's par ty .
A conceptual tool from sociological theory that helps explain whythe S P D 's
propaganda mayhave been successful in shaping the socialist workers ' opinions is Ellul 's
theory of "psychological crystalli zation." This theory explains the attitudes ofindividuals
already under the in fluence ofan ideologyor set ofvalues. Ellul states that this process
in an individual "closes his mind to all new ideas " and this "usuallytakes on an ironic
aspect: the man who has been successfullysub jected to a vigorous propaganda will
declare that all new ideas are propaganda." 1 43 "Psychological crystalli zation " applies to
the members ofthe S P D and other sympathetic workers because they were alreadypre 
indoctrinated by socialist ideology and there fore would tend to view the statements ofthe
Fatherland Pa rtyas p ropaganda.
The S P D 's counter -propaganda against the Fatherland Party was disseminated in
large part on the pages of Vorwiirts, the official partymedium . Ellul 's theory of
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"psyc hological crystallization " applies to t his propaganda because "t he S P D press
preac hed to t he converted . .. i t was boug ht and read largelyby partymembers ." 1 44
Moreover, Vorwlirts had a wide readers hip, because i t had a print run of 1 65,000copies
daily in 191 2and ot her smaller socialist publications reprinted its ar ticles and
propaganda . 1 45 T he propaganda found in Vorwlirts c haracterized t he Fat herland Party as
t he class enemy, by stating t hat t he new party was just a new name for an old foe, t he
Pan-Germans, and describing t he party's elite in terms t hat workers would understand
and re ject, suc h as forceful bosses and intolerant religious aut horities.
On 8 September 1917, t he first article about t he Fat herland Party appeared in
Vorwlirts. T he article, entitled ''T he New Party! A Mas querade oft he Pan- Germans,"

used t he analogyofan actor c hanging costumes to describe t he new pa rty. T he title
activates "psyc hological crystallization," because previous prewar socialist propaganda
had alreadymuc h earlier identified t he Pan- Germans as antagonists. T he Pan-Germans
had earlier contended t hat "Social Dem ocracy was simplyt he most ominous t hing
conceivable, t he original evil, t he repudiation oforder." 1 46 T he S P D did not want
wor kers an do ther members of the par ty to be foole dby the "new cos tume " of the Pan 
Germans. 1 47 T he a rticle continuously followed t his t heme, explaining to t he ca dres oft he
S P D t hat t hey would "realize at first sig ht, we are once again faced wit h a metamorp hosis
oft he Pan- Germans. Proofis t he names ofits leaders . " 1 48 T hese leaders were
recognized as Admiral von Tirpitz and Wolfgang Kapp and t he piece reminded its
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audience ofthei rpast involvement in the Pan- Ge rman League. Anothe rsto rydesc ribed
"M r. Kapp as the soul ofthe new pa rty" who "t ries to sti rup the new Chancello ragainst
the Reichstag." 149 The Socialists and thei rallies dominated the cu rrent Reichstag, so
Kapp and his new pa rty 's machinations to dest roy this coalition placed them in di rect
opposition to the goals and aims ofthe S P D. In essence, the Fathe rland Pa rtybecame the
new a rchetypal enemyofthe socialists,stepping into the role ea rlie rplayed by the Pan 
Ge rmans .
Despite ha rsh t reatment in the socialist p ress, �he Fathe rland Pa rty still attempted
to place adve rtisements in the Vorwarts and othe rwo rke rs ' publications, fullye xpecting
to be denied access to this medium and make capital ofthei re xclusion, and indeed, the
edito rs ofsocialist newspape rs re fused to p rint the adve rtisements fo rthe Fathe rland
Pa rty. Howeve r, the edito rof Vorwarts d id p rint the pa rty 's statement about the denial.
The Fathe rland Pa rtyc rowed that socialist "pape rs fea red thei rown reade rs and p refe r
caution ove rb rave ry." 1 50 The autho rofthe a rticle replied, ''This, ofcou rse, is an
impe rtinent m is rep resentation," because the Vorwarts 's sta ffcove red the founding ofthe
pa rtyea rlie r, even e xplaining thei raims and goals . 1 5 1 The edito rof Vorwarts went on to
cla rify: Vorwarts and othe rpublications "only refused to p rint the adve rtisement ofthe
Ge rman Fathe rland Pa rty to avoid any suspicion that they could be co rrupted by the
money that the Fathe rland Pa rty th rows a round right and left." 1 52
Socialists also began to complain about religious figu res u rging thei r flocks to
enlist in the new Fathe rland Pa rty. To show the c rude natu re ofsuch p ropaganda, the
1 49"Wer
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S P D a ctuallyprinted the appeal bythe pastor ofa chur ch in Nieders ch onhausen (a
se ction ofthe Pankow distri ct in Berlin) in Vorwarts without any commentary or
abridgement. The announ cement read as follows :
And what are you doing for Germany's great hour ?
1. Give your gold to the Fatherland
And
11
2. Sign the i War loan
And
3. Are you already a member ofthe German Fatherland Party?
N o-n o-no ? How will you pass in front ofyour Fatherland, your cons cien ce,
and your God ?
Well, who is not yet a member ofthe Fatherland Party, cannot pass in front of
Nieders ch onhausen or in front ofhis God . And remember, at heaven's gate they
che ck the membership books [ofthe Fathe rland Party]. 1 5 3
Soon after the founding ofthe Fatherland P arty, con cerned workers began to write to
S P D leaders, complaining ofindustry managers pressuring them to join the new party.
One con cerned employee wrote that his boss at a lo cal government agen cy "condu cted a
surveyamong his sub je cts about who wanted to attend the founding gathering ofthe
German Fatherland Party." 1 54 The "sub je ct" went on to explain that the fliers for the
event contained on the ba ck a membership card; in desperation the distraught worker
"as ked what one cou ld do against su ch for ce ful a ctions ." 1 55 The edi tors of Vorwarts
replied, "no man shall be for ced to join a politi cal partyand that no honorable man would
a l ow himselfto be for ced ". 1 56 Another storyrelated how the management ofthe Berlin 
based Fatherland Co ffee Shop tried to persuade its employees to enlist in the Fatherland
Partyand o ffered to pay for their employee's membership dues. The arti cle announ ced
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enthusiastically, "Nevertheless, not a single waiter has signed!" 1 57 The SPD stated it
would take the issue of governmental sponsorship of advertisements and employers'
pressure to join Tirpitz's party before the Reichstag.
On 6 October 1917, Otto Landsberg, a socialist deputy, made a speech in the
Reichstag against the Fatherland Party's dissemination of its propaganda in the army and
other governmental institutions without governmental censor. He spoke to support the
recent "Socialist interpellation concerning Admiral von Tirpitz and the new German
Fatherland Party." 1 58 Landsberg complained:
clergymen and the State authorities agitated among the population on behalf of
the Fatherland Party, and ... army officers, by speeches and the distribution of
pamphlets, carried on a propaganda among the soldiers against the Reichstag
[peace] resolution. 1 59
To reinforce his argument against officially sanctioned party propaganda, he informed the
Reichstag that the government had censored socialist publications, while "the Pan
German agitations, however, were regarded with favor." 1 60 Echoing earlier socialist
propaganda, Landsberg called the Fatherland Party a mere front for the Pan-Germans and
said that "at the head of this party there are men who hitherto-I will use parliamentary
language-have not suffered through the war," but only wished to profit from it. 1 6 1
These profits included annexations and inflated dividends from producing war materials,
157"Kaffee-Vaterlandspartei!," Vorwtirts (Berlin) , 27 Sept. 1917.
158"Reichstag Uproar Against Ministers," New York Times, 7 Oct. 1917.
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since the leaders of the new party were members of the landed aristocracy and upper
middle class industrialists. Landsberg provided numerous examples of military officers
actively soliciting for the Fatherland Party and even in passing mentioned the notorious
appeal from the pastor of Niederschonhausen. Landsberg ended his speech by appealing
to the Imperial Chancellor "not to allow the direction of affairs to be taken out of his
hands" and warned that the "welfare of the Empire will depend to a very great extent on
his attitude." 162 Landsberg's speech elicited cheers from the Socialists and outrage from
the Conservatives.
By applying Ellul's theory of "psychological crystallization," we can better
understand how the socialist propaganda likely affected the indoctrinated socialist in
regards to the Fatherland Party. The first two months of socialist propaganda in the
Vorwiirts (which reprinted the speeches given in the Reichstag regarding the Fatherland

Party and its propaganda) laid the foundation for how members of the SPD were
supposed to view this new party. The rhetoric used in the socialist propaganda created a
profoundly negative stereotype of the Fatherland Party. Socialists should now think of it
as merely a new embodiment of the old Pan-Germans, who opposed socialism on
principle, and wanted to destroy the Reichstag majority and the Peace Resolution of July
1917. In addition, the socialist propaganda presented the leaders of the Fatherland Party
in old terms familiar to workers, as bosses who pressure their employees, in this case to
enroll in the Fatherland Party. According to the concept of "psychological
crystallization," the indoctrinated socialist should regard the Fatherland Party as the
enemy and therefore, could be motivated to oppose this new party, while even further
162
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cementing his socialist commitment. The fact that socialist propaganda changed its
trajectory, becoming more action-driven (meaning that the propaganda was intended to
invoke a response in the targeted subject, after the original announcement and
descriptions of the Fatherland Party) proves the usefulness of Ellul's theory in regards to
the effectiveness of socialist propaganda.
The SPD's propaganda became more action-driven in early November 1917 as it
came to the conclusion that the Fatherland Party was not succeeding in reaching the
masses. However, the creation of the Fatherland Party, along with the SPD's powerful
anti-Fatherland Party propaganda, instigated a grass-roots movement against this new
right-wing party, which the SPD was quick to take advantage of in order to repair the
damage done to the socialist movement by the formation of the USPD. This instructive
propaganda urged SPD members to protest and break up Fatherland Party meetings,
which later escalated into the radicalism expressed during the general strike in Berlin and
throughout Germany at the end of January 1918. Moreover, the editors of Vorwarts used
the anti-Fatherland Party propaganda to solicit new members and hopefully win the
loyalty of some USPD members. Out of the four advertisements bidding people to join
the SPD found in the Vorwarts, from October 1917 through April 1918, three dealt
exclusively with the Fatherland Party, while the theme of the fourth was the unequal
distribution of the tax burden to pay for the war.
In mid-October 1917, the SPD ran an advertisement encouraging workers to join
the SPD that read as follows:
The Fatherland Party and its hypocritical propaganda are poisoning the
German political life. It is the obligation of the working classes to close ranks and
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to fight for peace and progress; therefore in defiance of the Fatherland Party
become members of the Social Democratic Party. 1 63
The passage explicitly urges the working class to "close ranks" or in other words to
reunite the two socialist movements into one mass organization that could defeat the
Fatherland Party. This theme continued for the next seven months, but became more
streamlined. Later, the advertisements actually functioned as membership registration
forms as well. An announcement in February, which was much more passionate than the
first, read:
It is our enemies who under the misleading name of the Fatherland Party
want to continue the war for eternity. We have to defeat them! And we will
defeat them, if we unite in the Social Democratic Party of Germany. Anyone who
wants this please fill out the following.
I hereby declare that I am joining the Social Democratic Party of Germany:
Name:
Occupation:
Address: 1 64
The third advertisement had the same theme as the first one that appeared in October, but
in addition, it too contained a membership registration at the end of the advertisement.
The fact that seventy-five percent of the announcements urging readers to enroll in the
SPD used the name of the Fatherland Party goes a long way to proving that the appeal
was effective and that the rank and file of the party opposed the idea of this "patriotic
party." It would seem that socialist propaganda succeeded in establishing the desired
stereotype in regard to the Fatherland Party and used it as a motivation to action,, in the
direction of outbidding their opponent' s claims to mass legitimacy.

163 Vorwarts (Berlin), 14 Oct. 1917.
1 64 Vorwarts (Berlin), 25 Feb. 1918.
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The political clash between the Fatherland Party and the SPD reached a climax
between November 1917 and February 1918. These two parties fought for influence
within the Imperial bureaucracy, and even more importantly, struggled over the ongoing
negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, as the newly formed Bolshevik regime in Rus�ia agreed to
a cease-fire. The negotiations continued until 3 March 1918, when after a massive
German advance, the Bolsheviks finally signed the dictated and harsh peace treaty. The
national leadership of majority SPD abstained from voting for the treaty, but did not vote
against it because they "were not prepared for a showdown with the Imperial government
over war aims" and, in reality, many SPD members actually supported the treaty, due to
the fact that a strong right wing had developed in the party after the many leftist members
joined the USPD. 165 The terms of the treaty seemed to parallel the annexationist aims of
the Fatherland Party, which desired the Baltic lands and frontier territories inhabited by
Poles. Although the members of majority SPD silently supported the treaty of Brest
Litovsk (only the Independent Socialists rejected the treaty), throughout December and
March, Vorwarts continuously agitated against the dictatorial tone of the peace talks. 1 66
While this agitation failed to influence the outcome of the peace settlement, it did arouse
popular feeling at home.
During these months, the management of Vorwarts crafted propaganda that
warned the working classes that if the "complete program of annexation in the east and
west" were realized, it would cause "inner political consequences," which would "have

165John L. Snell, "Wilson's Peace Program and German Socialism, January-March 191 8," The
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[an] enormous [negative] effect on the working classes." 167 Additionally, the socialist
press warned its readers that the Fatherland Party wanted "to fight democracy,
parliamentary reform, and the equal right to vote. In short any improvement or progress
when it comes to inner politics." 168 The reference to inner politics referred to the
Kaiser's tepid Easter promise of 1917 to reform the Prussian suffrage system, which had
not yet came to pass, and was an issue that the Fatherland Party agitated against. Another
propaganda article referred to Tirpitz's party "acting like a bull in a china shop" at a
meeting in Berlin discussing the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk by demanding a powerful
German presence on the Baltic Sea for the "military security of Germany's borders." 169
The article advised the government not to "follow the Fatherland Party because there
would not be peace, only shattered china." 170
At the same time this political conflict raged, the more active socialists began
protesting
at and disrupting Fatherland Party meetings and rallies throughout Germany. On 15
January 1918, a Fatherland Party rally of about three thousand people in Mannheim "was
frustrated by the Socialists" and later "dispersed by the police amid Socialist cheers." 17 1
On the same day, socialists interrupted another meeting in Jena and "after passing a vote
for 'a general peace by understanding' threw out the members of the Fatherland Party." 172
On the following day, "as soon as the Chairman of a big meeting that had been called in
Frankfort mentioned the Fatherland Party a tumult broke out and rioting followed. The
167
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police finally had to disperse the meeting." 1 73 Two weeks later, on 27 January, an article
in the New York Times stated:
The most interesting feature of the German situation today is the campaign
of the Fatherland Party and the great popular countercampaign [sic] . In countless
cases, and in all the big cities, the meetings of that organization have been broken
up, to the accompaniment of shouts for peace and singing of the 'Marsellaise. ' 174
This popular mass mobilization of the socialists, of which the clashes with the Fatherland
Party were a part, culminated in an attempt at a general German strike at the end of
January and the beginning of February. The Imperial government continuously banned
or censored Vorwiirts and other liberal newspapers throughout January and February
1 9 1 8 because it feared these newspapers would entice the German workers to strike in
support of the Austrian work stoppage that began on 1 6 January 1 9 1 8 . Therefore, most
of the news regarding the strikes was found in foreign newspapers and non-leftist
publications within Germany.
The German government was right to worry over the possibility of a strike in
Germany, because the day after Independent Socialist Adolf Hoffmann told the Prussian
Diet "Let events in Austria be a warning," the strikes began. 175 The strikes started at the
Torpedo Yard in Kiel and in only a few days spread throughout Germany. At the Krupp
works in Essen, it was alleged that "200 strikers forced 60,000 workers to strike," and on
29 January workers at the Vulcan shipyards in Hamburg went on strike. 176 In Berlin,
discontented workers protested for immediate ratification of the Prussian suffrage reform
bill. Foreign newspapers reported that throughout Germany 500,000 workers were on
173

"German Factions in Truce on Spoils," New York Times, 17 Jan. 1918.
George Renwick, "Peace Riots Halt Tirpitz Meetings," New York Times, 27 Jan. 1918.
175
"German Socialist Protest," Times (London), 25 Jan. 1918, p. 6.
176
"Hindenburg Warns Strikers in Berlin, Who Issue Ultimatum to Government; 500,000 Now
Out; Papers Suppressed," New York Times, 31 Jan. 1918.
174

57

strike; however, the "Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung insists that only youths are on
strike" and official government reports declared that the strikers never exceeded
185,000. 1 77 However, Vorwarts later claimed that there were in excess of 300,000
strikers. Regardless of the size of the work stoppage, the strikers had four demands that
they stated in the media of the Central Committee of trade unions:
First-An answer by the German Government to the speech made by
Lloyd George to the deputation of English trade unions.
Second-The fixing of German war aims in the west.
Third-The serious attention of the Government to the demand that in the
peace negotiations there shall be direct representation of the working-class
interests in full proportion to the representation of capitalistic interests.
Fourth-No further postponement of Prussian franchise reform. 1 78
The second, third, and fourth demands are extremely important, because the SPD and the
Fatherland Party were currently fighting over these issues. The second demand clarified
the workers' opposition to the Fatherland Party's desire to annex Belgium and Flanders,
because the workers claimed that they "only supported the war because they believed it a
war of defense" and they were not "bleeding and dying for Courland, Lithuania, Longwy,
and Briey, [or] for the destruction of Belgium's independence." 1 79 The third and fourth
stipulation explained that the working class wanted more representation in the
government. As another testament to the workers' hatred of the Fatherland Party,
Wilhelm Dittman, an Independent Socialist on trail for treason for instigating the strikes,
"declared that the strike broke out as the result of a 'social elemental event,' the
reaction . . . against the policy of the Fatherland Party and the Pan-Germans." 1 80
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Furthermore, Dittman claimed that "the German workers considered Admiral von Tirpitz
the intellectual originator of the strike." 1 8 1
Despite the fact that the majority SPD joined with Independent Socialists in
support of the workers, the strikes never attained any unity, and with this failure any hope
of once again unifying the socialist movement died. However, these disruptions
throughout Germany worried Hindenburg and Ludendorff, to the point that they
threatened to use military force to quell the strikes. On 3 February, the military
commandant of Brandenburg, General von Kessel, released the following statement:
"Employees failing to resume work will be tried by court-martial, which is authorized to
impose the sentence of death, execution to take place within twenty-four hours of the
time of sentence imposed." 1 82 The strike ended the next day without any concessions by
the government.
Despite the fact that the popular counter-campaign against the Fatherland Party
failed to influence the government to change its course in the war, to enact political
reform, or unify the socialist movement, it is still a testament to the importance and
effectiveness of the socialist propaganda. The SPD's propaganda disseminated in its
official newspaper, the Vorwarts, taught its cadres how to view and think about the
Fatherland Party. Next, the Socialist Party used this propaganda as negative
reinforcement to call workers to action, either to join SPD or to break up meetings of
Tirpitz's party. Moreover, socialist leaders used the extreme militarism and elitism of the
Fatherland Party to unify workers in attempting a general strike in order to achieve its
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real economic and political goals. These goals included "more food at lower prices, an
end to the black market, prosecution of war profiteers," a quick end to the war and
democratic reforms in Prussia. 1 83
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Chapter VI
Conclusion

The study of this new, active political public, represented paradoxically by both
the German Fatherland Party and the countermovement it inspired, is crucial to
understanding how the disintegration and fragmentation of German politics during World
War I led to the later political conflicts that defined the Weimar Republic. As implicit
splits that had opened during the war deepened, members of the extreme left faction of
the Socialist Party went on to found the Communist Party of Germany (KPD) on 31
December 1918, whose goal was to create a communist regime similar to Russia's in
Germany. The radical right, which had formed the core of the Fatherland Party, also
caused later disturbances in Weimar Germany. For example, Kapp attempted (but failed)
to overthrow the newly formed democratic German government in a miserable coup in
March 1920. Furthermore, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP)
under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, but earlier founded by Anton Drexler, a former
member of the Munich branch of the Fatherland Party, tried to bring down Germany's
representative government in the ill-fated Beer Hall Putsch of 1923. Ten years later, the
machinations of the Nazis and Communists, in large part an outgrowth of the earlier
conflicts between the Fatherland Party and the Left in the First World War, would shut
down the parliamentary system, ultimately leading to the appointment of Hitler as
German Chancellor.
Obviously, the main players in both the extreme-radical fringe of the right and left
caused disruptions during the Weimar years, but how far back did their radicalism go?
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And mor e importantly, at l east for this topic, was th e Fath erland Party proto- or pr e
fascist as so manyhistorians hav e argu ed ? To b egin with, sinc e th e t erms proto- or pr e
fascist lack a singl e d efinitiv e d efinition, th eyar e not us eful as conc eptual tools . It is b est
to simplyask wh eth er th e Fath erland Party was its elffascist or at l east had fascist
charact eristics . In ord er to answ er this qu estion, a us eful d efinition offascism is n eed ed .
Drawing on works on fascism by Hannah Ar endt, Martin Blinkho m, and Ian K ershaw,
on e can cat egoriz e fascism as a political mov em ent l ed by extr em e nationalist
r evolutionari es who d esir e a national r ebirth, aim to cr eat e a party abov e parti es that
gains mass app eal, and plan to impl em ent authoritarian rul e. 1 84 Following this d efinition,
examination ofth e Fath erland Party's propaganda shows that th e party did in fact contain
fascist el em ents . For exampl e, th e l ead ers ofth e Fath erland Party claim ed to b e abov e
party politics and to b e a mov em ent ofth e p eopl e aiming to cr eat e a r ebirth in G erman
soci ety. How ev er, b ecaus e th e party n ev er achi ev ed pow er, it would b e hard to d efin e th e
party as fully, functionally fascist . Mor eov er, to argu e that th e party was a pr ecursor to
Nazism would in a s ens e b e to assum e p erv ers elythat Nazism was th e only outcom e
possib le in postwar Germany.
How ev er, whil e th er e ar e c ertain asp ects ofth e Fath erland Party, such as
id eology, organizat ion, and propaganda that contain ed fascist el em ents, th e entir e d ebat e
ov er th e party's status as a pr ecursor to Nazism is not a valid on e for a vari etyofr easons .
Most important is th e fact that whil e th er e was an id eological foundation for Nazism
pr es ent in Imp erial G ermany, Nazism could not hav e evolv ed without particular ev ents in
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the post-war period, including the Treaty of Versailles, the stab-in-the-back legend, the
Great Depression, and the political infrastructure of the Weimar Republic. 1 85
Regardless of how important the earlier discussion on the Fatherland Party's
relationship to Nazism is to German history, scholarship on the Fatherland Party needs to
move beyond a fixation on this stalemated traditional argument, since it can never be
completely resolved, in order to gauge other vital issues surrounding the party. The fact
that the majority of the rightist voluntary associations of ;cmperial Germany joined
together to form a mass movement that ostensibly desired to create a cohesive, unified
German public is essential to understanding the evolution of the German Right from an
exclusive bastion of the nobles and the landed elite to the more popular and radical
notions of the Right in the Weimar years. Moreover, evaluating the attempt to direct
public opinion through the Fatherland Party's propaganda is critical to understanding
why the German population was willing to endure through the last grueling years of the
First World War.
David Welch argued, in Sins of Omission, that Germany' s propaganda during the
First World War was in fact, in contrast to the long-held view of its ineffectiveness,
sophisticated and able to meet the needs of the people. This seems to be true for the
propaganda of Germany's two largest political parties as well, as both the propaganda of
the Fatherland Party and the SPD resonated with many Germans, which led to a polarized
political landscape in wartime Imperial Germany. Princess Evelyn Blticher, the English
born wife of Count Blticher, the German Ambassador to England, aptly described this
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volatile situation by writing in her diary that All internal disputes and disagreements are
II

disappearing for the moment, being swallowed up in the vital conflict of the two great
parties, the democrats [SPD] and the 'Vaterlandspartei, ' which is daily increasing in
vehemence. 11 1 86
This clash, thus, helps to explain why the representatives of the Right and Left
were unable (or unwilling) to form a viable and functioning coalition in 19 19, which
could have been the foundation for a stable, democratic Germany. It also sheds light on
the evolution of the German masses from a politically passive group into an active and
vibrant political body, to which the most successful and dynamic political parties of the
Weimar period, the radical right, represented by certain members of the Fatherland Party,
and the far left, appealed for support. The leaders of these new political parties, who
reached their maturity in the First World War, had their political experience formed by
observing intense intra-party conflicts, of which the largest and most public was the
conflict between Fatherland Party and the SPD. This unique experience of mass
mobilization surely led to the radicalization of politics in 1920's and helped speed along
all the tragedies that produced Germany' s ultimate defeat in 1945 .
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